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Abstract
The protocol presented here guarantees that at least a
specified number, k, of destinations receive a given mes-
sage. The guarantees are deterministic and the failure prob-
ability is zero. Such a strong delivery assurance provides
a more powerful primitive than protocols which attempt to
minimise failure probability, and is useful for meeting many
user-level requirements. Simulations under a wide range of
settings confirm that the overhead is low even k is high,
and that the protocol is scalable. These desirable perform-
ance results are due to many design features, in particular,
the decentralised delivery management whereby any node
- manycast initiator or destination- can take responsibility
in a cost-effective manner for achieving the specified deliv-
ery ratio. The goal of attaining total reliability is compre-
hensively addressed: the design considers even the rare, but
not impossible, scenarios of the network behaving as an ad-
versary.
1. Introduction
The problem of efficient message delivery to multiple
nodes has been widely studied for ad-hoc networks, be it
sensor- or mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). The pro-
posed solutions include broadcast [17], multicast[12] and
manycast[3] protocols, with numerous application domains
suggested. Additionally, there has been considerable in-
terest in enhancing the reliability of these best-effort proto-
cols, which are known[11, 13] to have highly variable per-
packet delivery ratios once modest mobility, interference
or transient network partitions are possible. These reliab-
ility enhancement efforts include gossiping [4, 16], optim-
ised flooding[14], transmitting on encounters[5], and using
selective[15] or negative [22] acknowledgments to trigger
retransmissions. These protocols are shown to offer a higher
average delivery ratio through simulations, stochastic ana-
lysis or both. The delivery ratio actually obtained in a given
execution can be below (or above) the average observed or
estimated. Since the actual delivery ratio for a given mes-
sage cannot be known precisely, if an application needs to
satisfy certain application-specific requirements, remedial
action has to be taken. For example, periodic session mes-
sages are used in [9] to maintain data consistency, which
adds overhead even where the delivery ratio is high enough.
Similar measures are necessary if a minimum number of
nodes in a sensor network must be re-tasked for the fidel-
ity of the data to be high enough; the fact that too few nodes
have received a message might not be observed until after
the fidelity of the data is found to be too low, at which point
the event being observed might have disappeared.
In this paper, we are concerned with deterministic deliv-
ery guarantees, i.e. the delivery ratio for any given message
is guaranteed not to fall below a threshold specified for that
message. This threshold can be considered to take the spe-
cial case value of 100% in the protocols of [18, 20, 19, 7, 8]
where message delivery is guaranteed to all nodes. Guaran-
teeing delivery to all in a group, however desirable, often
involves making a simplifying assumption that no destin-
ation node leaves the group nor crashes during an execu-
tion of the protocol (see assumptions in [18, 19]). Without
this assumption, attempts to deliver a message to a departed
or crashed node must, strictly speaking, continue until that
node is known to have departed or crashed; these attempts
obviously increase the overhead. However, the nodes that
make up an ad-hoc network are both prone to failures (due
to, say, running out of batteries) and are likely to leave the
group, something which undermines the validity of the as-
sumption.
We here present a protocol, called Scribble, which per-
mits the minimum threshold to be less than 100%, thus al-
lowing a few nodes to depart or crash during the execution.
More precisely, it provides what we call k-deterministic de-
livery guarantees, where delivery is guaranteed to at least
k destination nodes. The value of k is chosen by the applic-
ation to be a realistic value. Such a service is called ma-
nycast in [3] to which we refer the reader for a collection of
applications, including distributed database consistency ap-
plications, mobile ad-hoc certificate authorities and various
ubiquitous computing applications, for which Scribble will
be an ideal candidate.
Note however that the authors of [3] regard what we call
k-deterministic delivery guarantees as full reliability and do
not provide it; the proposed protocols can occasionally de-
liver to less than k destinations, and it is left to the applic-
ation to choose parameters so that the probability of fail-
ure is low. In Scribble, the full reliability of [3] is the design
objective and affords the user the knowledge that at least k
nodes will receive the message when the protocol termin-
ates.
Clearly any protocol which provides deterministic de-
livery guarantees needs to include some sort of acknow-
ledgment of receipt from the receivers. This can easily lead
to the infamous ack-implosion problem even in relatively
static and benign network environments and is an even big-
ger concern in the highly dynamic environment that ad-hoc
networks represent. This observation has led a number of
researchers[15, 4, 16] to regard deterministic guarantees as
inherently impractical to provide. We agree that this is in-
deed the case if a single node (usually the originator) is kept
responsible for ensuring delivery by receiving acknowledg-
ments from all receivers. However, our investigations repor-
ted here indicate that ack-implosion is not a problem if that
responsibility is decentralized by distributing the responsib-
ility for ensuring delivery among the receivers. This is sim-
ilar in spirit to how SRM[6], by decentralising the respons-
ibility of packet loss detection and repair, is able to deal ef-
fectively with the ack-implosion problem in the IP multic-
ast context. Note that it is the principle of decentralization
we use, not SRM itself nor any variation of it. This prin-
ciple has also been used in[22] to provide high delivery ra-
tios in sensor networks.
In this paper we show how distributing responsibility for
delivery can provide efficient protocols with deterministic
guarantees by presenting a simple deterministically reliable
manycast protocol. We also show how its performance is
comparable to the well known best-effort multicast protocol
ODMRP[12]. The rest of the paper is organised as follows;
in the next section we present the problem definition and the
assumptions we make while section 3 presents the design is-
sues associated with the protocol. Section 4 contains the de-
scription of the protocol and section 5 contains the perform-
ance figures. Finally section 6 concludes with future work.
2. Problem Definition and Assumptions
A group G consists of n nodes, N0, N1, ..., Nn−1. The
nodes have similar computation, storage and transmission
capabilities, communicating by using the omni-directional
wireless transmit functionality of a CSMA MAC layer pro-
tocol. The protocol solves the deterministically reliable ma-
nycast problem defined as follows:
2.1. Deterministically Reliable Manycast Problem
Given that any node in1 G, say N0, can initiate at any
time, say t0, the manycast of a data packet, denoted as m, a
manycast protocol satisfies the following three properties:
(i) Integrity: a node that delivers m (to a higher level ap-
plication) delivers it exactly once,
(ii) Termination: at least k, 1≤k≤n, nodes in G deliver m
within some bounded time after t0, where k is a ma-
nycast parameter; and
(iii) Network Subsidence: within some bounded time after
t0, transmissions of m or any packet related to the ma-
nycast stop.
By these definitions, exactly-once delivery of a packet
m is guaranteed to at least k nodes within some bounded
amount of time and with a bounded transmission overhead.
It is trivial to see that if k = n, the problem becomes the
more familiar (and more difficult) deterministically reliable
broadcast problem.
2.2. Assumptions
In order to solve the deterministically reliable manycast
problem, the following conditions have to be met:
1. Each node has a unique ID.
2. At least k nodes in G are operative for the duration of the
manycast.
Condition 1 is necessary to determine whether at least k dis-
tinct nodes have received m; it can be trivially met in most
networks. The need for condition 2 is also intuitive; if m is
to be delivered to at least k nodes, at least k nodes in G have
be operative.
Network assumption In ad-hoc networks, due to relative
node mobility, interference, various obstacles or power-
saving measures it is possible for a subset of nodes in the
group to get partitioned from the rest of the group at any
moment in time, i.e. none of the nodes in a given subset is
able to communicate with any other node not in the subset.
If partitions can be permanent, then clearly the termination
property may not be met: if N0 (that initiates the manycast
of m) and fewer than k other nodes are in one subset, and
if this subset is isolated permanently from any other subset,
then no node in the latter subset can ever receive m. There-
fore, the minimal requirement for solving the deterministic-
ally reliable manycast problem is that at least one subgroup
1 The initiator of m need not be in G
that contains at least k operative nodes of G, must not suf-
fer a permanent partition. We call this requirement the min-
imal liveness requirement and the manycast protocol should
provide the necessary guarantees so long as the network sat-
isfies this requirement.
Minimal Liveness Requirement To state the minimal live-
ness requirement precisely, we will first define what con-
stitutes a permanent partition (or the absence of it) in the
ad-hoc networking context, whether that network is static
or mobile. Nodes can be in each other’s wireless range for
two main reasons; either because (as is typically the case in
sensor networks) the nodes set their transmit power and re-
ceive sensitivity to a high enough level, or (as is the case
in MANETs) the nodes have moved physically close. Let δ
be the maximum delay associated with receiving and pro-
cessing a packet. If two nodes are in the wireless range of
each other without any interference (due to contention, col-
lisions or interference from obstacles or other nodes) for
less than 2δ time, then the duration of this connectivity may
be insufficient for one node to send a request and receive a
response from the other. We will say that two nodes are con-
nected for direct interaction or simply directly connected, if
both are in wireless range of each other without any inter-
ference for a period of at least β + 2δ time, where β ≥ 0
is the maximum time a requested node chooses to take be-
fore transmitting its response.
Consider two nodes Ni and Nj . During a given interval
of some finite duration I ¿ β+2δ, the network may cause Ni
and Nj to be in each other’s wireless range without any in-
terference never, once or more than once. In the latter cases,
the nodes may be directly connected never, once or more
than once; further, the larger the β, the smaller the likeli-
hood of a direct connectivity. We will say that Ni and Nj
directly connect during [t, t+I] if the nodes directly con-
nect at least once during [t, t+I], and this will be denoted as
Ni!t,I Nj .
Consider now a set S of nodes. Intuitively, S will not ex-
perience a permanent partition after t0 if for any non-empty
subset S ′ of S, some node, say N, in S ′ and some other
node, say N’, in S − S ′ directly connect with each other at
least once during I of some finite duration; i.e. Ni!t,I N’i
holds for all t ≥t0.
Note that the identities of the connecting nodes N and N’
can be different in different intervals. Consider t2 ¿ t1≥t0.
It is possible that N1!t1,I N’1 and N2!t2,I N’2, where
N1 $=N2 or N’1 $= N’2. This accounts for the fact that the ad-
hoc network can enable (as well as disallow) two nodes to
experience direct connectivity at any instance.
Note also that the value of I is unspecified; it can be ar-
bitrary but must be finite; Specifying a value for I would re-
quire an ability to predict future network behaviour, an exer-
cise which is highly unlikely to succeed, except under very
restrictive assumptions.
As per the definition, if none of the nodes in S ′ directly
connect to any node(s) in S − S ′ during some [t, t+I] for
all possible finite values of I, then S ′ is permanently parti-
tioned from the rest of S from time t onwards. We next ap-
ply this notion of permanent partition in the context of a ma-
nycast initiated by N0 at time t0 within G. Let us define Gk
as the set of all sets such that each element-set contains N0
and at least k other nodes of G. The minimal liveness con-
dition requires that there be at least one Gk ∈ Gk that does
not suffer a permanent partition. Formally, the ad-hoc net-
work satisfies the minimal liveness requirement for a ma-
nycast initiated by N0 at time t0 within G only if:
∃Gk ∈Gk : ∀ t≥ t0, ∀ G′k ⊂Gk: ∃N∈G′k, ∃N’ ∈Gk-G′k:
N!t,I N’ for some finite I.
3. Design Issues
Any deterministic protocol design must address the fol-
lowing three issues:
1. Message Dissemination. Basically how the de-
sired coverage (i.e., at least k receiving m) is achieved.
Our protocol handles this in a distributed man-
ner. The responsibility for dissemination initially
rests with the manycast originator and is sub-
sequently passed around to other nodes ensuring that
the desired coverage is achieved with as small a trans-
mission overhead as possible; further, this distribu-
tion of responsibility is carried out with no access
to a routing structure or any information about net-
work topology. We call this aspect of the protocol
Responsibility Distribution, elaborated further in sec-
tion 3.1.
2. Coverage Deduction. Given that the desired coverage
is achieved, this fact needs to be deduced so that the
manycast operations can terminate (c.f. network sub-
sidence). Our protocol ensures that any responsible
node deduces the achievement of the desired coverage
once the latter is obtained, and does so using local in-
formation (i.e. in a distributed manner). We call this
Realisation, and give further details in section 3.2.
3. Termination Attempt. When the network conditions are
extremely hostile, any scheme used for (1) which is
also cost-effective in terms of transmission overhead,
cannot by itself guarantee the desired coverage. How-
ever, a deterministic protocol should not terminate un-
til and unless the desired coverage has been obtained.
So, a deterministic protocol has to resort to a more ag-
gressive (and thus more expensive) measure, when the
cost-effective scheme is deemed ineffective. The meas-
ure our protocol takes on is guaranteed to succeed once
the ad-hoc network satisfies the minimal liveness con-
dition. Section 3.3 explains further how this Termina-
tion on Minimal Condition is achieved.
3.1. Responsibility Distribution
If a node is responsible for m , it transmits m once every
β seconds; otherwise it does not transmit m. Obviously, the
number of nodes simultaneously responsible should be kept
low, particularly when increasing that number would not
provide any further coverage. The scheme employed for
responsibility distribution achieves this objective by striv-
ing to keep at most one node responsible in any subset of
nodes that are in each others wireless range (a fully connec-
ted subset). Moreover, at least one node is kept responsible
in the group as a whole to ensure that the desired cover-
age is achieved.
The responsibility distribution scheme makes use of the
following known results:
R1: The additional coverage expected from a node’s trans-
mission drops exponentially with the number of trans-
missions that have already occurred in the node’s wire-
less range immediately before that transmission [17].
R2: Consider two nodes with clocks whose values
never decrease. Let these nodes transmit a mes-
sage timestamped with their local clock values. If
the nodes receive each other’s message, it is not pos-
sible for both the nodes’ local clocks to be smaller
than the timestamp on the message they receive.
In our protocol, a node’s local clock is a logical clock. A lo-
gical clock is just an integer counter whose value can only
increase, though not necessarily in relation to the passage of
real-time. A node Ni constructs a logical clock Li(m) with
the initial value of zero when Ni first knows ofm. If Ni is re-
sponsible form, it increments Li(m) by 1 and stampsmwith
the value of Li(m) just prior to transmitting it. This serves
as the logical timestamp (denoted as m.l) of the outgoing m.
Suppose that a node Nj which is not responsible form re-
ceivesm. Nj becomes responsible form if (A1)m.l of the re-
ceived m is greater than, or equal to Lj(m) and, (A2) Nj has
not received m in the past β-δ seconds. It then sets Lj(m)
= m.l of the received m, chooses a Random Assessment
Delay (RAD) uniformly distributed on (0, MAX RAD), and
schedules the first of its periodic transmissions ofm (includ-
ing the increment of Lj(m)) to happen at the expiry of the
chosen RAD. If Nj has received another transmission of m
in the past β-δ seconds it means that at least two nodes in
Nj’s wireless range have been responsible for m in the re-
cent past. In conformance with R1, Nj does not become re-
sponsible in that case.
If a responsible node Ni receives m such that (B1) m.l
of the received m ¿ Li(m), it relinquishes the responsibil-
ity for m and cancels any pending transmission of m. Note
that since a node that has become responsible performs its
first transmission following the expiry of a RAD, this rule
may cause that node to relinquish responsibility, without
ever transmitting m.
When two responsible nodes receive each other’sm, (A1)
and (B1) do not permit both nodes to relinquish respons-
ibility (due to R2). However, one of them must relinquish
unless both have identical clock values and transmitted m
nearly at the same instant. This is unlikely for two reasons:
responsible nodes generally end up having identical clock
values when they become responsible by receiving copies
of the same m (thereby setting their L(m) to m.l of the re-
ceived m); they however begin schedule their first trans-
mission (and thus increment their L(m) again) after a ran-
domly chosen RAD. With an appropriately large value for
MAX RAD, two nodes are unlikely to choose the same
RAD, and thus unlikely to have the same L(m) and trans-
mit m with the same m.l.
When a node has m but is not responsible for m, it is said
to be passive on m. The example below illustrates the work-
ings of the responsibility distribution scheme.
Consider a subset C of fully connected nodes, i.e., all
nodes in C are in wireless range of each other. Let us sup-
pose that |C| ≤ k and that C contains c0 which initiates a
manycast m. Also suppose that every node in C other than
c0 receives m with m.l = 1 and become responsible. If c1 ∈
C chooses the smallest RAD it ends up transmitting m with
m.l = 2. Upon receiving m from c1, c0 will relinquish re-
sponsibility for m; if we assume that all other nodes receive
m from c1 before their respective RAD expires (i.e., before
they transmit m which would result in increasing their L(m)
that is currently 1), only c1 will be responsible in C. That is,
the responsibility for m has now passed from c0 to c1 .
Consider next a node d /∈ C that is in wireless range with
only c1 in C and receives m with m.l = 2. When d becomes
responsible and transmits m with m.l = 3, c1 becomes pass-
ive. Note that C now has no active node in it, while another
fully connected subset (which contains c1 and d) gains a re-
sponsible node.
3.2. Realisation
The protocol requires that each node Ni maintain a list,
Ki(m), containing the unique ’signatures’ of nodes which
Ni knows to have received m2. When Ni transmits m, it ap-
pends Ki(m) in a dedicated header field (m.K) of the packet.
If it receives m whose m.K does not have its signature and
if it subsequently decides not to transmit m, it transmits a
small acknowledgment packet for m. It is worth noting that
2 This can easily be optimized to only requiring responsible nodes to
maintain K(m), if storage is at a premium.
this does not cause an ack-implosion, as the acknowledg-
ment packets only ever travel one hop.
The following rules enable Ni to realise m:
1. Ni realises m when Ki(m) contains k signatures other
than its own.
2. On realisation or upon receivingm thereafter, Ni trans-
mits a realisation packet formwhich contains the id of
m.
3. Nirealises m on receiving a realisation packet for m.
Note that receiving a realisation packet does not cause
Ni to send a realisation packet of its own.
A node signature is essentially an acknowledgment tagged
onto m, and, as with any acknowledgments, the required
size of the signature depends heavily on what can be as-
sumed about the nodes in the group and their ids. That is,
there is a natural trade-off between how much can be as-
sumed about the id-space, and how much the signatures can
be compressed. As an example, consider the following pos-
sible types of signatures, presented in decreasing order of
required storage:
(i) An IP address (usually 32-bits). This assumes very little
about the id-space (a node can use any unique IP-
address), but uses a lot of storage.
(ii) The last byte of an IP address (8 bits). This assumes all
nodes use addresses from the same IP subnet.
(iii) Assume nodes are uniquely ordered and each node
knows its relative ordering. This permits K(m) andm.K
to be a boolean vector (indexed by the ordering on
nodes) and a node’s signature to be represented by a
single bit in the vector. This is ideal for large groups,
as storage requirements are very low.
Note that node ordering is straightforward if nodes are man-
aged and deployed by a central entity, for example the
owner of a sensor network can easily order ids prior to de-
ployment or repopulation; it can be tricky when new nodes
are allowed to join the group autonomously. In [21] and we
describe how it is solved, particularly the management of
nodes attempting to joining concurrently, using Scribble it-
self. The description of the protocol and the subsequent sim-
ulation results assumes 8 bits are used for a node signature,
similar to (ii) above, unless otherwise stated.
3.3. Termination on Minimal Network Condition
In adversarial situations, an ad hoc network may not al-
low the desired coverage to be achieved simply by distribut-
ing the responsibility for dissemination. To illustrate this, let
us revisit the example from section 3.1. The fully-connected
subset C contains ci which initiates a manycast m. Since |C|
≤ k, some more nodes, such as d /∈ C, must receive m. In
the absence of any such dwhich enters the wireless range of
some ci ∈ C , it is easy to see that the desired coverage can-
not be obtained.
Putting the above differently, the desired coverage is
guaranteed only if some ci ∈ C has in its wireless range
one or more nodes, such as d /∈ C, for a period of at least
β + 2δ (i.e. ci and d are in direct connectivity) and if dur-
ing this period of direct connectivity ci is responsible . The
former is required by the minimal liveness condition on the
network (see section 2), while the latter needs to be ensured
by the protocol. Note that an ad-hoc network that satisfies
the minimal condition can choose any ci ∈ C and place the
chosen ci and d in direct connectivity at arbitrarily chosen
timing instants. Indeed, the ad-hoc network can behave like
an adversary, enabling the direct connectivity between ci
and d only when the former is passive. This means that a
protocol which keeps only a subset of nodes in C respons-
ible, however cleverly designed, cannot guarantee that the
right nodes in C are responsible at the right time. So, the
’desperate’ measure taken by our protocol involves allow-
ing all nodes in C to eventually become responsible when
the manycast appears not be terminating.
Each node Ni has a parameter θi. If Li(m) ≥ θi or if Ni
receives m with m.l ≥ θi, then Ni becomes responsible (if
it is not already) and does not become passive until it real-
ises m. Ni is then said to be in the ANGRY (Actively eN-
Gaged to ensure ReliabilitY) state, and θi is called the AN-
GER (Active eNGagement to Ensure Reliability) threshold
whose value can be chosen by Ni autonomously.
The discussion on the example above indicates that the
desperate measure of our protocol is necessary for termin-
ation if the minimal condition holds eventually. In the full
paper[21], we show that it is also sufficient to achieve ter-
mination and for any responsible node to achieve realisa-
tion. This also allows us to claim that any deterministic pro-
tocol must allow every node that has m, to enter the ANGRY
state; otherwise, termination cannot be guaranteed even if
the ad-hoc network meets the minimal liveness condition
(but behaves like an adversary).
Two remarks are in order. The more nodes enter the
ANGRY state, the higher the transmission overhead be-
comes. However, entering the ANGRY state is the only rem-
edy when the network behaves like an adversary; such be-
haviour may be rare in practice but cannot be ruled out
and must be addressed by the design of any deterministic
protocol. Secondly, transient, and even prolonged, parti-
tions are common in ad-hoc networks, and their occurrences
should not be misread by the protocol as adversarial net-
work behaviour. It is therefore recommended that a large
value should be chosen for the ANGER parameter θi and the
application be signalled about having to enter the ANGRY
state for a given manycast (thus perhaps allowing the ap-
plication to abort it, if appropriate).
4. Protocol Description
Each node maintains a cache, msg cache, with all the
data packets that node is currently responsible for, and
maintains a data structure LastRecv(m) containing the last
time a copy of m was received. The predicates respons-
ible(m), passive(m) and realized(m) are set to true if the
node is responsible for, or passive on m, or m has been real-
ized respectively. In addition each node maintains the lo-
gical clock, L(m), for each packet it has received, and keeps
the knowledge, K(m), relating to any m it is currently pass-
ive on which has yet to be realized.
We also assume each node has the ability to perform a
wireless transmit, and can schedule such a transmit at some
future time as well as cancelling an already scheduled trans-
mit if this transmission has not yet happened. All these as-
sumptions should be readily met by most ad-hoc network-
ing devices, including second generation sensor nodes, such
as Berkeley Motes[10].
In order to initiate a reliable manycast of a packet, the
initiating node calls RBCast() which results in updating
Algorithm 1 RBCast()
RBCast(DataPacket m)
{
m.id = {my id, seq#};
K(m) += my id
L(m) = m.l = 0;
msg cache.add(m);
ScheduleTransmit(m.id, NOW);
}
the required data structures and scheduling a transmission.
Transmit(), if not cancelled, actually transmitsm and sched-
ules itself after β seconds (Algorithm 2) . If a node receives
Algorithm 2 Transmit()
Transmit(m.id)
{
m.K = K(m);
L(m) = m.l = L(M)+1;
wireless transmit(m);
ScheduleTransmit(m.id,β);
}
a realization or an acknowledgment packet, RBReceiveR-
ealization() or RBReceiveAck() is called respectively . Fi-
nally, when a data packet is received, RBReceive() is called
5. Protocol Performance
In this section we will compare the performance of
Scribble when k = n (i.e. when providing determinist-
ically reliable broadcast) to ODMRP. ODMRP is a well
known best-effort multicast protocol which has been shown
Algorithm 3 RBReceiveAck() and RBReceiveRealiza-
tion()
RBReceiveAck(Acknowledgment ack)
{
K(m) += ack.id;
if(realized(ack.id))
{
transmitRealizationPacket(ack.id));
cancel pending transmits(ack.id)
delete K(ack.id);
msg cache.delete(ack.id);
realized(ack.id) = TRUE
}
}
RBReceiveRelization(RealizationPacket real)
{
msg cache.delete(real.id);
cancel pending transmits(real.id);
delete K(real.id);
realized(real.id) = TRUE;
}
Algorithm 4 RBReceive()
RBReceive(DataPacket m)
{
if(m.K !contain my id)
{
transmitAck(m.id);
}
if(L(m) undefined)
{
L(m) = m.l;
K(m) = m.K;
K(m)+= my id;
deliver(m);
}
K(m) = m.K + K(m);
if(realized(m.id))
{
transmitRealizationPacket(m.id));
delete K(m.id);
msg cache.delete(m.id);
}
else if(passive(m.id))
{
if((LastRecv(m.id) + (β-δ) < NOW
&& m.l >=L(m)))
{
L(m) = m.l;
msg cache.add(m);
ScheduleTransmit(m.id,
random(0, MAX RAD));
responsible(m.id) = TRUE;
}
}
else if(responsible(m.id))
{
if(m.l > L(m) && m.l < θ)
{
L(m) = m.l;
msg cache.delete(m.id);
cancel pending transmits(m.id);
passive(m.id) = TRUE;
}
}
LastRecv(m.id) = NOW; }
to perform well in various simulation studies[13, 11]. We
will also explore the performance of Scribble when vary-
ing k, and see how choosing varying β provides a
latency/overhead tradeoff.
5.1. Simulation Model
The simulations were carried out using the
Glomosim[23] wireless network simulator and the
BonnMotion[1] mobility generator, with 50 nodes in
1000m2 area. Each simulation ran for 3000 seconds, mul-
tiple runs were made with differing random seeds for any
given simulation parameter and the collected data was av-
eraged over those runs. The only service assumed to be
available to the protocols was that of omni-directional wire-
less transmit (for example no link-layer feedback was as-
sumed) using a CSMA MAC layer. We used the Two-Ray
(Ground Reflection) propagation model with a channel ca-
pacity of 1Mbps. The Random Waypoint mobility model
was used, keeping the minimum speed constant at 1m/s and
varying the maximum speed. Being aware of recent cri-
ticisms of the Random Waypoint model [2], we set the
pause time to be 0 seconds and discarded the first 1000
seconds of simulation time. The simulations were run with
1 sender and 50 receivers. We kept the global packet trans-
mission rate constant at 1 512 byte packet/sec for the first
500 seconds of simulation time. This is not very a high net-
work load, but we were in this instance not interested in
the performance of the protocols under congested condi-
tions.
For the comparative simulations we used the implement-
ation of ODMRP which ships with glomosim-2.033, using
the default parameters as suggested by its authors, noting in
particular that the route refresh interval was set to 3 seconds.
In an attempt to be as fair as possible, we decided to fix the
values for β and MAX RAD in the Scribble protocol for
all comparative simulation runs. The chosen values were:
β=75s and MAX RAD=0.2s which should serve as a de-
cent default values; for reasons stated in section 3.3, θi was
chosen to be a high value of 666(!) so that no node enters
the ANGRY state.
5.2. Network attributes
A wide range of MANET and sensor network scenarios
was modelled by varying the following two key attributes:
1. Rate of change of Topology: This typically comes
about either as a result of mobility of nodes
3 We are grateful to the Network Research Group at University of Ore-
gon for supplying a crucial bug-fix to the ODMRP implementation
used.
(MANETs), or due to nodes changing the trans-
mit power/receive sensitivity of their radios to save
power (sensor networks). We chose to model the
rate of change of topology using the former (from
1 to 35m/s), and believe it should also capture the
change of topology brought about due to the lat-
ter.
2. Density: This is a measure of how many nodes can typ-
ically be reached by one wireless transmit. We vary
density by varying the wireless range of nodes while
keeping the simulation area and number of nodes con-
stant (except in figure 8). The wireless range was var-
ied between 150 and 350m.
It is worth noting that previous performance evaluations,
where the number of nodes and the simulation area have
been comparable to ours, have tended to set the wireless
range to 250m (e.g. [13]), and sometimes even discard sim-
ulation scenarios where network partitions occur. However,
we test Scribble even for sparse and frequently partitioned
networks. An indication of the severity of the network con-
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ditions is provided in figure 1 which shows how the num-
ber of partitions varied throughout a typical simulation run
when the wireless range was 150m (i.e. the sparsest case
considered). Note that 1 partition implies the network is not
partitioned, which never happens. We note that partitioning
occurs for all wireless ranges below 300m.
5.3. Performance Metrics
The following metrics were considered:
1. Transmission Overhead: Measures the total number
of bytes transmitted by each node in order to com-
plete one manycast. This includes both control (ack,
hello, topology control, etc.) and data packets (includ-
ing packet headers). It is measured in bytes transmit-
ted per byte manycast, and was measured at the MAC
layer.
2. Latency: Measures the average time from a node ini-
tiates a the manycast of a packet until a node receives
that packet. This was measured at the application layer.
3. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR):Measures the percentage
of nodes that received a given manycast packet. For
Scribble, when k = n, this is guaranteed to be 100%.
This was also measured at the application layer.
The above metrics cover most of the important aspects in
both the MANET and sensor network environments.
5.4. Comparative Simulation Results
This subsection compares our deterministically reliable
manycast protocol for k=n (deterministically reliable broad-
cast), with the widely used ODMRP best-effort multicast
protocol.
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Figure 2 shows the impact that relative change of topo-
logy has on the two protocols, when the wireless range of
the nodes is set to 250m. PDR is shown as bars with a range
from 90-100% as shown on the right y-axis, while the trans-
mission overhead is drawn as lines relative to the left y-axis.
As expected, ODMRP performs relatively well with
these parameters (these conditions are in fact very sim-
ilar to that chosen by the ODMRP authors themselves
in [12]), with mobility having little impact on the trans-
mission overhead, as there are no reconstruction efforts
in place in case the routing mesh breaks. This natur-
ally then results in its PDR being very variable and suf-
fers as mobility increases. Scribble, on the other hand,
provides its delivery guarantees with little additional over-
head compared to ODMRP, with this additional over-
head being higher when the mobility is relatively low.
The reason for this is that Scribble guarantees deliv-
ery to all nodes including those which might be transi-
ently partitioned of from the rest. When the mobility is low,
these partitions takes longer to heal, so the cost of guaran-
teeing delivery to partitioned nodes is higher, thus increas-
ing the overall cost of guaranteeing delivery.
It is worth noting that ODMRP is never able to provide
a PDR greater than 97%, even under these rather benign
conditions. Even worse in terms of reliability, when the
packet delivery ratio for individual packets is studied, the
variability which this relatively high average PDR masks
becomes apparent; in extreme cases, when the originating
node is partitioned from the rest of the network, the pro-
tocol terminates with only the originating node itself hav-
ing received the packet.
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Figure 3 shows the average latency of ODMRP and
Scribble for the same scenario as above. What is imme-
diately obvious is that Scribble has a higher latency than
ODMRP. The reason for this is that the average latency of
Scribble is increased by the amount of time it takes to de-
liver packet to the nodes which ODMRP does not attempt to
deliver to. The figure illustrates this point, as the latency is
highest at 15m/s and 35m/s, the very same points at which
ODMRPs PDR is at its lowest.
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Figure 4 shows how transmission overhead and PDR
vary as function of density, while figure 5 shows how
latency is impacted. The general trend here is that the trans-
mission overhead and latency of Scribble suffers as density
is decreased and thus network partitioning becomes more
frequent, while ODMRP PDR performance is degraded,
even going as low as 50% in the sparsest case. It is worth
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noting how ODMRP never manages a 100% PDR in any
of the simulation scenarios and how the Scribble protocol
manages to provide its deterministic delivery guarantees
even under very sparse and frequently partitioned network
conditions.
5.5. Exploratory Simulation Results
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Figure 6 shows how the performance of Scribble var-
ies with k. Particularly noteworthy is the case when k is set
0.5n. In this case the actual PDR is comparable to, with the
associated overhead being lower than, ODMRP, while at the
same time guaranteeing that at least 50% of all nodes re-
ceive every packet manycast.
Choosing a value for β also impacts the protocol per-
formance. Figure 7 clearly shows how reduced transmis-
sion overhead can be traded for an increase in latency and
vice versa.
Finally, figure 8 indicates that Scribble is relatively scal-
able, showing how increasing the number of nodes in the
network impacts the transmission overhead when reliable
broadcast (i.e. k=n) is performed. Note that in this experi-
ment the signatures used was an n-sized bit vector as dis-
cussed in section 3.2.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have presented a deterministically reli-
able manycast protocol, Scribble, which is able to provide
k-deterministic guarantees, which we argue is a very power-
ful primitive. We have compared Scribble with ODMRP,
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and have shown that these guarantees do not necessarily
come with a large overhead.
We are in the process of implementing Scribble on the
TinyOS platform, and future work includes studying the
impact of an on-the-fly re-tasking application on Berkeley
Motes using Scribble, which should provide interesting in-
sights into the performance of a determinstically reliable
protocol in a real deployment.
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Appendix
The Liveness Requirement
We will assume that the group G is formed some time be-
fore t0 and consists of n nodes, N0, N1, ..., Nn−1. Any node
can initiate a manycast with parameter k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, at or
after t0. The liveness condition described earlier is restated
below for a given k ≤ n.
LetGki be defined as the set of all sets such that each set
Gki ∈ Gkicontains at least k nodes of G including Ni. The
liveness condition requires that for each Ni ∈ G there be at
least one Gki ∈ Gki that does not suffer a permanent parti-
tion. Formally, the ad-hoc network satisfies the liveness re-
quirement for G only if:
∀ t≥ t0, ∀ Ni ∈ G: ∃Gki ∈Gki : ∀ G′ki⊂Gki : ∃ N ∈G′ki ,
∃ N’ ∈Gki-G′ki : N!t,I N’ for some finite I.
If k = n, the liveness requirement gets simplified as: ∀ t
≥ t0, ∀ non-empty G′⊂G: ∃ N ∈G′, ∃ N’ ∈G-G′: N!t,I N’
for some finite I.
Recall that N!t,I N’ is defined as direct connectivity
between N and N’, i.e., N and N’ are in the wireless range
of each other at least once for a period of at least β +2δ dur-
ing [t, t+I], where δ is the maximum delay a packet can
experience for being received and processed at a destina-
tion node, and β is some known constant. Note that it is the
MANET that decides which of the nodes from distinct sub-
sets experience direct connectivity, and these decisions can-
not be predicted.
Part A: Correctnesss of the Reliable Manycast Pro-
tocol
Assuming that the liveness requirement holds and k ≤ n,
correctness for a given manycast m is established in three
stages.
First, we show that at least one node remains responsible
in any execution of the protocol until a node realises (The-
orem 1). The proof is based on the fact that the node that
initiated the manycast is initially responsible and a node be-
comes passive only after ensuring that it has made another
node responsible (Lemma 1).
We then show in Lemma 2 that if the execution con-
tinues longer without realisation, then nodes start entering
the ANGRY state where individual nodes remain respons-
ible until realisation. (To establish correctness, we will as-
sume that there is no application-level termination of ma-
nycast.) Lemma 3 proves that if the execution still continues
without realisation, at least k nodes must enter the ANGRY
state and at least one node must reach realisation in some
bounded amount of time. Theorem 2, based on these lem-
mas, argues that the integrity and the termination properties
are met in any execution. Finally, Theorem 3 deals with the
network subsidence.
We make the following two useful observations on the
protocol execution:
Observation 1: During an execution of the protocol, the
value of Li(m) cannot decrease. Li(m) is never set to a lower
value in lines 15 and 21; it is increased just before m is
transmitted.
Observation 2: A responsible node cannot be passivated
by receiving a packet transmitted by itself. For a received m
to passivate a responsible Ni, it must have m.l ¿ Li(m) (see
line 20). None of the packets transmitted by Ni can have m.l
¿ Li(m).
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that manycast
m is initiated by node N0at t0. Let E be the set of all pos-
sible executions of the protocol for m. Let Etx be the set of
all executions in which no node realises m until tx, tx≥ t0
and x be a natural number. Obviously, E = Et0and (E - Etx)
is the set of all executions in which at least one node real-
ises m before tx, tx¿ t0. Further, Ety , ty¿ tx, is the set of
those executions in Etxwhich continue without realisation
until ty .
A node Ni enters the ANGRY state when Li(m) ≥θi. Let
θmax = max{θi: 0 ≤ i ≤ (n-1)}. Let t1 = t0 + β θmax. The-
orem 1 proves that in every execution E ∈ Et1 , at least one
node remains responsible at any time t, t≥ t1 .
Lemma 1
In an execution E ∈ Etx , let Na(n−1) , 0≤ a(n−1)≤(n-1),
become permanently passive at some real-time pa(n−1) , t0
¡ pa(n−1) ¡ tx. Let the value of La(n−1)(m) at pa(n−1)be de-
noted simply as La(n−1) . There must be a node Na(n−2) ,
0 ≤ a(n−2)≤(n-1) and a(n−2) $= a(n−1), that remains re-
sponsible in E at some time t, pa(n−1)- δ ≤ t≤ pa(n−1) , with
La(n−2)(m) = La(n−1) .
Proof:
When Na(n−1) became passive for the last time at
pa(n−1) , La(n−1)(m) cannot increase beyond La(n−1) since
La(n−1)(m) is set only when Na(n−1)either is responsible
(line 21) or becomes responsible transiting from the pass-
ive state (line 15). Na(n−1) experiences neither after pa(n−1)
.
Since pa(n−1) ¡ tx, Na(n−1) cannot have realised m and
it must have become passive at pa(n−1)only after receiv-
ing a passivating message. That message cannot be from
itself (see observation 2) but must be from another node.
Let that node be Na(n−2)and its message be denoted as
ma(n−2) . It must be that ma(n−2) .l = La(n−1)(see line 21). So,
La(n−2)(m) ≥ La(n−1)after pa(n−1) . Since Na(n−1)received
ma(n−2)at pa(n−1) , Na(n−2) must have transmitted , and
therefore was responsible, at time t, pa(n−1)- δ ≤ t≤ pa(n−1)
as ma(n−2)can take at most δ time to be received; also,
La(n−2)(m) = ma(n−2) .l = La(n−1) at t . Hence the lemma.
Corollary:
Let Na(n−1) , 0 ≤ a(n−1)≤(n-1), become permanently
passive at pa(n−1)¡ txin an execution E ∈Etx . Any m trans-
mitted by Na(n−1)during execution E cannot passivate a
node Na(n−2) , 0 ≤ a(n−2)≤(n-1) and a(n−2) $= a(n−1),
that has remained responsible with La(n−2)(m) ≥ La(n−1) ,
where La(n−1) is the value of La(n−1)(m) at pa(n−1) .
Proof:
Follows from the following two observations on the pro-
tocol: (i) any m ever transmitted by Na(n−1)during E will
have m.l ≤ La(n−1) ; (ii) for a m to passivate a respons-
ible Na(n−2) , it must have m.l ¿ La(n−2)(m). By lemma 1,
La(n−2)(m) ¿ La(n−1) .
Theorem 1.
Let t1 = t0 + β θmax. In any E∈Et1 , at least one node
remains responsible at any time t, t ≤ t1.
Proof:
By contradiction. Let us suppose that no node remains
responsible at time t ≤ t1 in some E∈Et1 . Let p≤ t be
the earliest time when no node was responsible in E. This
means that there is no responsible node to activate a pass-
ive node. So, no node can ever become responsible after p
and, by the definition of Et1 , no node ever realises m in E.
Without loss of generality, let Na(n−1) , 0 ≤ a(n−1)≤(n-1),
be the last node to become permanently passive in E, say, at
real-time pa(n−1)= p.
By lemma 1, there must be a node Na(n−2) , 0≤ a(n−2)≤
(n-1) and a(n−2) $= a(n−1), responsible at time t, pa(n−1)- δ
≤ t ≤ pa(n−1) , with La(n−2)(m) ¿ La(n−1) , where La(n−1) is
the value of La(n−1)(m) at pa(n−1) .
If Na(n−2)remains responsible beyond pa(n−1) , then the
contradiction is established. Let us therefore assume other-
wise: Na(n−2) is passivated permanently before pa(n−1) . By
corollary, none of the packets transmitted by Na(n−1)during
E can passivate Na(n−2) . This means that, by lemma 1, there
must be a node Na(n−3) , 0 ≤ a(n−3)≤(n-1) and Na(n−3)
/∈ {Na(n−2) , Na(n−1)}, responsible at time t, pa(n−1)- δ ¡
t ¡ pa(n−1) , with La(n−3)(m) ¿ LAa(n−2) , where La(n−2) is
the value of La(n−2)(m) when Na(n−2)became permanently
passive. Applying this reasoning iteratively for ak, k∈ {(n-
1), (n-2), .., 1}, and assuming that the node Na(k) , 0 ≤
a(k)≤(n-1), is not responsible beyond pa(n−1) , we have:
There is a node Na0 , Na0 /∈ {Na1 , Na2 , .., Na(n−1)}, re-
sponsible at time t, pa(n−1)- δ ¡ t ¡ pa(n−1) , with La0(m) ¿
La1 . Na0 that remains responsible at time t cannot be pas-
sivated by packets transmitted by itself (observation 3) nor
by a permanently passive node (corollary). That is, Na0 can-
not be passivated by any packet transmitted during E nor
does it realise m before pa(n−1)¡ t1. So, it must remain re-
sponsible after pa(n−1) . This is a contradiction.
Lemma 2.
Let t2 = t1 + (k-1) I . In any E∈Et2 , at least k nodes enters
the ANGRY state for m by time t2.
Proof:
The node that initiates the manycast of m, initialises its
logical clock L(m) to zero and becomes responsible. A re-
sponsible node increments its L(m) by 1 once every β. A
passive node that becomes responsible, only increases its
L(m) to m.l of the received m. So any node that remains re-
sponsible at t, t1≤ t ≤ t2, during E must have its L(m) ≥
θmax. Therefore, it must be in the ANGRY state for m and
will remain responsible throughout E ∈ Et2since no node
realises m until t2.
By theorem 1, there is at least one responsible node at
t1 during E, which must also be in the ANGRY state for m.
Let that node be denoted as Ni. There must be a set Gkiof
at least k nodes (including Ni) which meets the liveness re-
quirement.
LetA⊆Gki be the set of all nodes that are in the ANGRY
at t, t1≤ t≤ t2, during E ∈ Et2 . For every I time, at least one
N∈A will directly connect to one or more N’ ∈ G‖〉 − A
(liveness requirement). This will make N’ enter the ANGRY
state, letting | A | increase by at least 1. Thus, by time t2,
| A |= k. Hence the lemma.
Corollary 2.
Let t′2 = t1 + (n-1) I . In any execution E∈ Et′2 , every
node in Gkienters the ANGRY state for m by time t′2, given
that Niis in the ANGRY state at t1 .
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 indicates that the set A
⊆Gki of all ANGRY nodes increases in size by at least 1 dur-
ing E starting from at t1. Since k ≤| Gki |≤ n, every node
in Gkienters the ANGRY state by t1 + (n-1) I during E.
Lemma 3.
Let t3 = t′2 + ((n − 1)(k − 3) + k − 1)I . At least one
node realises m by t3 in any execution, i.e., Et3= { }.
Proof:
Et3 is the set of those executions in Et1and Et′2which con-
tinue without realisation until t3. By theorem 1, at least one
node, say Ni, is in the ANGRY state for m at t1 during any
E ∈ Et3 . By Corollary 2, all nodes of Gkiare in the ANGRY
state by t′2 during any E ∈ Et3 . Let the nodes of Gkibe
grouped into disjoint sets, N1, N2, ..., Ng , such that all
nodes in a givenNy , 1 ≤ y ≤ g, have identical knowledge
about the nodes that have received m: ∀y, 1 ≤ y ≤ g, ∀
Nj , Nj′ ∈Ny: Kj(m) = Kj′ (m). at t, t′∈≤ t ≤ t3. Note that
if g = 1, then this means that all nodes of Gkihave identical
K(m); since every ANGRY node has itself in its own K(m),
all nodes of Gkimust have realised. Therefore, by the defin-
ition of Et3 , g ¿ 1 at t2; since k ≤| Gki |≤ n and K(m) of
each node in Gkican be distinct, k ≤ g ≤ n.
Let us assume (the worst case) that g = n at t′2 during E.
This means that each ANGRY node has entered in its K(m)
for itself and the initiator of m. So, each of the (n− 1) non-
initiator nodes requires (k−2)more entries and the initiator
(k − 1) more entries in their respective K(m).
By the liveness requirement, at least one node, say, N ∈
Ny , for every y, 1 ≤ y ≤ g, must get directly connected
with some N’ ∈ Gki- Ny at least once in every interval of I
time. Since all nodes are in the ANGRY state and K(m) of
N and N’ are different, either N or N’ or both should gain
additional entries during the period of direct connectivity,
i.e., the number of entries in K(m) of N or N’ or both should
increase by at least one.
Assuming the worst case, it can be claimed that ex-
actly one node increases the number of entries in its K(m)
for every I time beginning with t2; in this manner, each
of the (n − 1) non-initiator nodes acquires (k − 3) more
entries and the initiator (k − 2) more entries in their re-
spective K(m) by t′2 + ((n − 1)(k − 3) + k − 2)I. That
is, every node in Gkihas one entry short of realisation at
t′2 +((n− 1)(k− 3)+ k− 2)I. In the next I time, one node
in Gkimust gain one more entry in its K(m), i.e., one node
must realise by time t′2 + ((n− 1)(k − 3) + k − 1)I . That
is, Et3 must be empty.
Corollary 3.
At least one node in Gkirealises m by time t3 = t1 + (n-
1) I +((n − 1)(k − 3) + k − 1)I , given that Niis in the
ANGRY state at t1.
Proof: Follows from Corollary 2 and the proof arguments
for Lemma 3.
Theorem 2.
The protocol meets the Integrity and the Termination
properties.
Proof:
Since a node does not discard L(m) for m it delivers, any
m received subsequently is recognised as a duplicate and is
not delivered. Thus, the integrity property is met in any ex-
ecution E ∈ Et0 .
By lemma 3, at least one node realises m in any execu-
tion E ∈ Et0 . This means that all nodes deliver m. Further,
by lemma 3, node realisation must occur by time t3 in any
execution E. (t3 − t0) = ((n − 1)(k − 3) + k − 1)I+(n −
1)I + βθmax = ((n− 1)(k − 2) + k − 1)I+βθmax . Since
θmax, β, n, k, and I are all bounded, (t3 − t0) is a bounded
amount of time. Hence the theorem.
Lemma 4. In all executions of Et0 , any responsible node
permanently stops transmitting m within a bounded amount
of time after t0.
Proof: By contradiction. Suppose that a node, say Ni, re-
mains permanently responsible for m in some E ∈ Et0 . The
node must enter the ANGRY state after (t0 + βθmax). By
Corollory 3, at least one node in Gkirealises m within a
bounded amount of time after t0. Let t4 be the maximum
of the earliest instant when the first node realises m in E
and (t0 + βθmax). Let R, A and P denote the subsets of
Gkiwhich contain nodes that have realsied m, that are in the
ANGRY state for m, and that are either passive on m or
have not yet received m, respectively, at time t ≥ t4 during
E. Note that any responsible node after (t0 + βθmax) must
be in the ANGRY state and thereforeR∪A∪P = G‖〉 . Fur-
ther, | A |= 0 implies that there is no responsible node in
Gki and therefore no node in Gki (which includes Ni) trans-
mits m, and that there is a contradiction. Let us for now sup-
pose that | A |$= 0 .
At t4, | R |≥ 1. By the liveness requirement, at least one
node, say, N∈A, must get directly connected to some node,
say, N’ ∈ Gki - A , at least once between t and t + I , ∀t ≥
t4 . There are two possibilities:
• Case (a). N’ ∈R. N’ transmits a realisation packet for
m after receiving m from angry N (line 10). So, N real-
ises m by receiving the realisation packet from N’ (al-
gorithm 3), reducing | A | by 1.
• Case (b). N’ ∈ P . N makes N’ responsible and also
enter the ANGRY state, thus increasing | A | by 1.
If only (a) occurs after t4, then, by t4 + (n − 1)I , | A |=
0. In the worst case, however, only (b) occurs in E until |
P |= 0 which must happen by t4 + (n − 2)I , since | P |
can be at most (n − 2) at t4. After t4 + (n − 2)I , only (a)
can occur; therefore, by t4 +(n− 2)I +(n− 1)I , | A |= 0
. Since (t4 − t0), n, and I have bounded values, | A |= 0
becomes true within a bounded tome after t0 - indicating a
contradiction.
Theorem 3.
The protocol meets the Eventual Network Subsidence
property.
Proof: By lemma 3, any responsible node permanently
gives up transmitting m at some time during the execution.
With no m to be received, a passive node will remain per-
manently passive and a realised node will not transmit a
realisation packet. Hence the theorem.
Part B: The Impossibility Result
Let Π be the set of all reliable manycast protocols that
guarantee manycast delivery by at least k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n,
nodes, given that (i) the only assumption made on the to-
pological changes of the MANET is the liveness condition,
and (ii) nodes have no 1-hop neighbourhood knowledge. Let
εpi be the set of all possible executions of pi ∈ Π in which
m is manycast (by some node) at time t0. During an exe-
cution E ∈ εpi , a node never enters the ANGRY state (for
m), if for any time t after the node receives m, there ex-
ists s, s ≥ t, such that (i) the node does not realise m at s,
and (ii) the node transmits nothing (i.e., remains silent) dur-
ing [s, s+S], where S ≥ β + 3δ.
Two observations can be made on the above definition. If
a node terminates the protocol execution before realising m
or remains permanently passive on m, then it never enters
the ANGRY state for m. The negation of the above defin-
ition defines what is meant by entering the ANGER state:
a node enters the ANGRY state for m if it transmits m or
any packet (e.g., a gossip packet) related to m once every τ
time, 0 ≤τ ¡ β +3δ, until and unless m is realised. (In our
protocol, τ = β and a node transmits only m in the ANGRY
state for m.)
Theorem 1:
∀pi ∈ Π, ∃ E ∈ εpi: at least one node enters ANGRY state
during E.
Proof:
By contradiction. We will suppose that nodes never enter
the ANGRY state in any execution of pi and construct an E
in which m cannot be received by more than (k-1) nodes.
Let t<k ≥ t0be some time in E when fewer than k nodes
have m. Starting from t<k, the MANET can behave in the
following adverserial manner and thereby block any further
dissemination of m, while at the same time meeting the live-
ness condition.
The liveness condition requires that two nodes, say N
and N’, each from a distinct particular subset, be in direct
connectivity of each other, for all t ≥ t<k, at least once
during [t, t + I] for some finite but arbitrary I (chosen by
the MANET itself). Let the execution E be such that both
the candidate nodes have their silent periods in [t, t + I]
and the silent period of one node, say N, [s, s + S],
is identical to or contained in that of N’, [s′, s′ + S′]:
[s, s + S] ⊂ [s′, s′ + S′]. If the MANET keeps N and
N’ in the wireless range of each other from (s + δ) to (s
+ β + 3δ), it satisfies the liveness condition. However, the
nodes are silent during the period of their direct connectiv-
ity and no information exchange can occur between them.
Thus, m can never be received by k or more nodes dur-
ing E, if all direct connectivities mandated by the liveness
condition occur after t<k only between nodes which are δ
time into their silent periods and remain silent throughout
the direct connectivity period. It is possible during some E
∈ εpibecause the nodes have no 1-hop neighbourhood know-
ledge and the protocol pi has to determine a node’s silent
period without this information. Hence the theorem.
Remark: Though the probability that all necessary dir-
ect connectivities occur between silent nodes during an ex-
ecution E is non-zero, it becomes smaller as E continues
longer. Hence we observe that manycast reaches k or more
nodes without any node entering the ANGRY state if the AN-
GER threshold θ is chosen to be large and if the nodes gos-
sip on a given m longer.
